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Abstract
Automated decision systems (ADS) have become
ubiquitous in many high-stakes domains. Those systems
typically involve sophisticated yet opaque artificial
intelligence (AI) techniques that seldom allow for full
comprehension of their inner workings, particularly
for affected individuals. As a result, ADS are
prone to deficient oversight and calibration, which
can lead to undesirable (e.g., unfair) outcomes. In
this work, we conduct an online study with 200
participants to examine people’s perceptions of fairness
and trustworthiness towards ADS in comparison to a
scenario where a human instead of an ADS makes
a high-stakes decision—and we provide thorough
identical explanations regarding decisions in both cases.
Surprisingly, we find that people perceive ADS as fairer
than human decision-makers. Our analyses also suggest
that people’s AI literacy affects their perceptions,
indicating that people with higher AI literacy favor ADS
more strongly over human decision-makers, whereas
low-AI-literacy people exhibit no significant differences
in their perceptions.
1. Introduction
Automated decision-making has been increasingly
adopted in areas such as hiring [1], lending [2],
or even policing [3]. As the underlying systems,
often referred to as automated decision systems
(ADS), are informing evermore high-stakes decisions,
it is of utmost importance to understand their inner
workings—particularly for individuals affected by
their decisions, because any malfunction (e.g., unfair
decisions) will have staggering consequences for them.
The reasons for adopting ADS are manifold [1,
4]. In fact, if properly designed and deployed, they
are a valuable tool to combat stereotyping and thus
contribute to overall social equity, e.g., in the fields
of recruitment [5, 6], health care [7, 8], or financial
inclusion [9]. That said, ADS are typically based
on artificial intelligence (AI)—specifically, machine
learning (ML)—techniques, which leverage historical
data to inform future decisions. Now, if historical data is
biased (e.g., because certain socio-demographic groups
were systematically disfavored), an ADS will likely pick
up and perpetuate existing patterns of unfairness [10]. A
significant body of research on algorithmic fairness from
the recent past has identified such instances where ADS
are causing harmful outcomes, e.g., in job ad delivery
[11], facial recognition [12], recidivism prediction [13],
or grading [14]. These instances, among others, have
likely been contributing to a recent general decline in
trust towards AI [15].
In recent years, an extensive body of research has
been devoted to detecting and mitigating unfairness
in ADS—mainly from a computer science viewpoint
[16]. A significant part of this work, however, has
focused on formalizing the concept of fairness and
modifying ML algorithms to satisfy different statistical
equity constraints, without considering the feedback of
individuals affected by automated decisions. Among
others, Srivastava et al. [17] emphasize this need for
better understanding people’s attitudes towards fairness
of ADS. We argue that this research gap creates the
potential for a plethora of high-impact contributions
from information systems (IS) research around people’s
perceptions of fairness and trustworthiness towards
ADS. This work is vital not only from a moral
perspective but also regarding the effective design
and implementation of ADS—with the end goal of
creating decision systems that are fair, trustworthy,
and, as a result, suitable for wide adoption. To that
end, we conduct a study to better understand people’s
perceptions of fairness and trustworthiness towards
ADS in comparison to the (hypothetical) scenario where
a human instead of an ADS makes the decision. We
furthermore analyze how these perceptions may change
depending on people’s background and experience with
AI.
Another issue of ADS revolves around explaining
automated decisions to affected individuals. It is widely





understood that opaque (i.e., black box) ML models
do not allow for meaningful interpretations as to how
or why certain outcomes were arrived at [18, 19].
Prior research has also shown that explanations can be
an effective tool for more transparent decision-making
[20, 21]. Therefore, in this work, we provide
study participants with thorough explanations regarding
decisions—identical for both the case of the ADS and
the human decision-maker. The context of our study is
lending, which is a common high-stakes application of
ADS [22].
2. Background and related work
Harris and Davenport [4] define automated decision
systems (ADS) as systems that aim to minimize human
involvement in decision-making processes. In many
cases, ADS have the potential to make more consistent
decisions than humans [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. Such systems
are popular in several industries, such as banking [2, 4]
or hiring [1, 5, 6, 23]—and they are emerging in new
areas as well, e.g., in health care [7, 8]. With their
increasing adoption in different high-stakes areas, it
is vital to ensure that ADS reach fair and transparent
decisions. However, there have been multiple cases in
the recent past where algorithms made discriminatory
decisions, e.g., based on people’s gender or race [3,
12, 13]. Additionally, the underlying ML models
are increasingly considered black boxes, making their
interpretation challenging [18].
2.1. Explainable AI
Despite being a popular topic of current research,
explainable AI (XAI) is a natural consequence of
designing AI-based ADS and, as such, has been around
at least since the 1980s [24]. Its importance, however,
keeps rising as increasingly sophisticated (and opaque)
AI techniques are used to inform evermore high-stakes
decisions.
Explanations can be distinguished along different
dimensions. Adadi and Berrada [21], e.g., differentiate
between model-specific and model-agnostic
explanations. Model-agnostic explanations refer to
methods that are not bound to a single type of ML
model and are therefore more generalizable—which
is why we employ them in this work. Examples of
the model-agnostic (example-based) explanation style,
which provide information people can potentially
act upon, are counterfactual explanations [25]. In
brief, counterfactual explanations provide people with
information regarding the minimum changes that would
lead to an alternative (generally the desirable) decision.
Meske et al. [20], among others, discuss different
types of explanations relevant to the IS community,
particularly model-agnostic explanations. They argue
that explainability is essential for evaluating automated
systems. People affected by an automated decision may
be particularly interested in explanations to assess the
fairness or trustworthiness of the associated ADS. Other
popular model-agnostic explanation styles include
the provision of the relevant features used by an ML
model or (permutation) feature importance [26]—both
of which we employ in this work since they could
be plausibly provided by both human and automated
decision-makers (i.e., ADS). We refer to, e.g., Adadi
and Berrada [21] or Goebel et al. [27] for more in-depth
literature on the topic of XAI.
2.2. Perceptions of fairness and
trustworthiness regarding ADS
A relatively new line of research, primarily in
AI and human-computer interaction (HCI), has started
focusing on perceptions of fairness and trustworthiness
in automated decision-making. Binns et al. [28] and
Dodge et al. [29], e.g., compare fairness perceptions in
ADS for distinct explanation styles. Their works suggest
differences in effectiveness of individual explanation
styles—however, they also note that there does not
seem to be a single best approach to explaining
automated decisions. Lee [30] compares perceptions
of fairness and trustworthiness depending on whether
the decision-maker is a person or an algorithm in the
context of algorithmic management, involving tasks
like work scheduling or evaluation. Their findings
suggest that, among others, people perceive automated
decisions as less fair and trustworthy for tasks that
require typical human skills. Lee and Baykal [31]
explore how algorithmic decisions are perceived in
comparison to group-made decisions. An interesting
finding by Lee et al. [32] suggests that fairness
perceptions decline for some people when gaining an
understanding of an algorithm if their personal fairness
concepts differ from those of the algorithm. Regarding
trustworthiness, Kizilcec [33], e.g., concludes that it is
essential to provide the right amount of transparency
for optimal trust effects. We generally believe that this
line of research would benefit significantly from novel
contribution of IS scholars.
2.3. Human vs. automated decisions
People encounter algorithms and automation in
different settings. Therefore, it is essential to understand
how this automation makes people feel and to infer
the social force of algorithms. While engineers tend
to show optimism in the ability of ADS to trace and
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mitigate human biases and stereotypes, laypeople are
often worried about AI taking over [34]. However,
Castelo et al. [35] found that in case of perceived
objective decisions, people favor automated advice, and
for subjective decisions they prefer human advice. This
is similar to the findings by Lee [30]. Yet, according to
the study by Castelo et al. [35], the perceived objectivity
of a task can be altered; thus trustworthiness of and
reliance on an automated decision can be increased.
Perhaps less surprisingly, Kramer et al. [36] found that
people’s preference for human or AI-based decisions
also depends on their prior experiences with ADS.
A major issue with ADS is that people are
often unaware of their existence. Eslami et al.
[37], e.g., uncovered people’s ignorance towards the
algorithm behind Facebook’s news feed. More
than half of the participants in their study were
unaware of the algorithm’s manipulations, and some
responded with anger and dissatisfaction. This
unawareness—apart from negative experiences [12, 14],
among others—might be part of the reason why many
people have such a profound aversion against algorithms
[15, 38]. Increasing people’s awareness of ADS, e.g., by
proactively disclosing the nature of the decision-maker,
and considering their perceptions of these systems, may
help raise acceptance in situations where ADS can make
better (e.g., fairer) decisions than humans.
2.4. Our contribution
We aim to complement prior research (e.g., [28,
29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36]) to better understand
people’s perceptions of fairness and trustworthiness
towards ADS vs. human decision-makers in high-stakes
settings. Specifically, our goal is to add novel
insights in the following ways: First, we integrate
different model-agnostic explanations and provide them
to study participants to enable them to assess the
decision-making procedures. This contrasts with
most existing work, which have typically employed
distinct individual explanation styles only. Second, we
provide identical model-agnostic explanations to study
participants for both the case of ADS and the human
decision-maker to not bias the collected responses.
Third, we examine how perceptions may change for
people with high vs. low AI literacy [39]. To
the best of our knowledge, the combination of the
previous aspects has not been examined before. Fourth,
we consider the provider-customer context of lending,
which differentiates our work from, e.g., Lee [30], who
has analyzed the perceptions of human vs. automated
decisions in algorithmic management. Finally, we aim
to bring (back) to the IS community pressing relevant
issues of societal relevance, which have experienced
seminal contributions mostly from other communities,
such as computer science and HCI.
3. Research hypotheses
Drawing on Chan [40], informational fairness is
about “people’s expectation that they should receive
adequate information on and explanation of the process
and its outcomes.” In accordance with Bélanger et
al. [41], we define trustworthiness as the perception
of confidence in the reliability and integrity of the
ADS. People often tend to avoid algorithms and
prefer a human decision-maker over an automated one,
even in situations where the algorithm outperforms
the person. This phenomenon is called algorithm
aversion [38]. Based on this theory, as well as recent
developments regarding a decline in trust towards AI
[15], we formulate our first two hypotheses, which
conjecture higher perceptions of informational fairness
and trustworthiness towards human decision-makers as
compared to ADS:
H1 People’s perceptions of informational fairness are
higher when they are told the decision-maker is a
human as compared to an ADS.
H2 People’s perceptions of trustworthiness are higher
when they are told the decision-maker is a human
as compared to an ADS.
Experts of a certain type of decision procedure
may have different attitudes towards a decision that
touches on their area of expertise than laypeople.
Wang et al. [42], e.g., found a significant effect
of general computer literacy on fairness evaluations
in automated decision-making. In the work at hand,
we measure a construct that applies more directly to
our context: We measure people’s AI literacy, i.e.,
their “set of competencies that enables individuals to
critically evaluate AI technologies; communicate and
collaborate effectively with AI; and use AI as a tool
online, at home, and in the workplace” [39]. We are
interested in whether differences in people’s AI literacy
change their perceptions of informational fairness
and trustworthiness towards human vs. automated
decision-makers. Thus, we formulate the following
additional hypotheses:
H3 People’s AI literacy moderates the effect of the
nature of the decision-maker (human vs. ADS)
on people’s perceptions of informational fairness.
H4 People’s AI literacy moderates the effect of the
nature of the decision-maker (human vs. ADS)
on people’s perceptions of trustworthiness.
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4. Methodology
We evaluate our hypotheses in the context of
lending—an example of a provider-customer encounter.
Specifically, we confront study participants with
situations where a person was denied a loan. We argue
that this is a common context that affects many people
at some point in life. According to, e.g., Atico [22], this
is also an area where ADS are commonly employed for
high-stakes decision-making.
4.1. Study design
Overall setup We choose a between-subject design
with the following conditions: First, we reveal to study
participants some basic information about the lending
company—similarly to the study setup introduced in
our earlier work [43]. We then explain that the
company rejected a given individual’s loan application.
Afterwards, we randomly allocate study participants to
one of two conditions: 50% of participants are provided
the information that an ADS made the decision, and
the other 50% are told that the decision-maker was a
human being. We then provide identical explanations
regarding a decision to study participants in either
condition, the exact specifications of which will be
derived and explained in more detail shortly. Finally,
we measure perceptions of informational fairness
(INFF) and trustworthiness (TRST) through multiple
measurement items, drawn (and partially adapted) from
previous studies (INFF: Colquitt et al. [44]; TRST:
Carter and Bélanger [45], Chiu et al. [46], Lee [30]).
Additionally, we measure AI literacy (AILIT) of study
participants, with items partially derived from Long and
Magerko [39] as well as Wilkinson et al. [47].
Data and ADS We design and implement a functional
ADS for our study—similarly to earlier work by the
authors [43]. The ADS consists of an ML model
that predicts loan approval on unseen data and can
output different explanations. For training our model,
we utilize a publicly available dataset1 on home
loan application decisions, which has been used in
multiple data science competitions on the platform
Kaggle.2 The dataset at hand consists of 614 labeled
(loan Y/N) observations. It includes the following
features: applicant income, co-applicant income, credit
history, dependents, education, gender, loan amount,
loan amount term, marital status, property area,
1https://www.kaggle.com/altruistdelhite04/
loan-prediction-problem-dataset (last accessed: August
24, 2021)
2Kaggle is the world’s largest data science community (https:
//www.kaggle.com/)
self-employment. Note that comparable data—reflecting
a given finance company’s circumstances and approval
criteria—might, in practice, be used to train ADS [48].
After removing data points with missing values, we
are left with 480 observations, 332 of which (69.2%)
involve the positive label (Y) and 148 (30.8%) the
negative label (N). As it is common in ML-based
applications, we use 70% of the dataset to train our
ADS and use the remaining 30% as a holdout set for
the experiment. As groundwork for the design of our
ADS, after encoding and scaling the features, we train
a random forest classifier [26]. The classifier is then
able to predict the (unseen) held-out labels—which it
achieves with an out-of-bag accuracy of 80.1%. We
use this classifier as a basis for the scenarios and
explanations that participants are confronted with.
Explanations Recall that 50% of study participants
are assigned the ADS condition and 50% the human
condition. Both conditions are provided with
identical explanations regarding the decisions—the
only difference is that study participants in the ADS
condition are told that the ADS provides the explanatory
information. In contrast, participants in the human
condition are told that a company representative (i.e., a
human) provides this information.
We now explain in more detail the provided
explanations. As noted earlier, we employ only
model-agnostic explanations [21] in a way that they
could plausibly be provided by humans and ADS
alike. First, we disclose all features (applicant income,
co-applicant income, etc., as mentioned earlier),
including corresponding values (e.g., applicant income:
$3,069 per month) for an observation (i.e., an applicant)
from the holdout set whom our ADS denied the loan. We
refer to such an observation as a setting. In our study, we
employ different settings to ensure generalizability.
We also explain to study participants the importance
of these features in the decision-making process. For
that, we compute permutation feature importances [26]
from our model and obtain the following hierarchy,
ordered from most to least important: credit history
> loan amount > applicant income > co-applicant
income > property area > marital status > dependents
> education > loan amount term > self-employment
> gender. Note that feature importance is a global
explanation style, meaning that this ordered list will be
identical for any setting (i.e., applicant).
For each setting, we finally provide three
counterfactual scenarios where one actionable feature
each is minimally altered such that our model predicts a
loan approval instead of a rejection (e.g., the individual
would have been granted the loan if, everything else
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unchanged, the co-applicant income had been at
least $800 per month). To ascertain which of the
features are actionable—in a sense that people can
(hypothetically) act on them to increase their chances
of being granted a loan—we conducted an online
survey with 20 quantitative and qualitative researchers.
According to this survey, the top-5 actionable features
are loan amount, loan amount term, property area,
applicant income, co-applicant income. We finally
provide counterfactual explanations for a random subset
of three of these features per setting.
4.2. Data collection
We conducted a between-subjects online study to
test our hypotheses. Participants for this study were
recruited via Prolific3 [49] and randomly assigned
to either the human decision scenario or the ADS
decision scenario. Every participant was provided
with two questionnaires associated with two different
settings. In each questionnaire, we asked participants
to rate their agreement with multiple statements per
construct on 5-point Likert scales [50]. A score of
1 corresponds to “strongly disagree” and a score of
5 to “strongly agree”. To be able to understand
participants’ quantitative responses better, we included
multiple open-ended questions as well. We had to
eliminate 4 of the 200 collected responses due to failure
to pass an attention check—therefore, we analyzed
196 responses. Among our participants, 62% were
male, 36% female, and the remaining 2% referred
to themselves as non-binary or did not disclose their
gender at all; 42% were students, 29% employed
full-time, 11% employed part-time, 7% self-employed,
10% unemployed, and 1% chose not to disclose their
profession. The average age of participants was 26.4
years.
5. Quantitative and qualitative results
Before conducting our tests, we assess the validity
and reliability of our latent constructs (INFF, TRST,
AILIT), each of which is measured through multiple
items. We note that average variance extracted (AVE)
is above or equal to the recommended threshold of
0.5 for INFF and TRST, while the AVE of AILIT is
0.39. According to Fornell and Larcker [51], if the AVE
value of a construct is low, its convergent validity can
still be sufficient if composite reliability (CR) is above
0.6. The CR of all our three constructs, INFF (0.83),
TRST (0.94), and AILIT (0.72) is, in fact, above the
3Prolific is an online platform for recruiting high-quality
research participants.
threshold of 0.7, which is recommended by Barclay et
al. [52]. Therefore, our convergent validity is sufficient
for AILIT as well. Values for Cronbach’s alpha (CA)
are larger than the recommended threshold of 0.7 for
our three constructs, indicating good reliability [53].
Validity and reliability measures are summarized in
Table 1.
5.1. Comparison of perceptions
We conduct two Mann-Whitney U tests [54] to
examine the differences in perceptions between ADS
and human decision-makers. The Mann-Whitney U
test for informational fairness is statistically significant
(p = 0.017), suggesting a significant difference between
participants’ perceptions of informational fairness.
Comparing the means of perceptions of informational
fairness for both conditions reveals that the ADS
condition (M = 3.68) is perceived to be significantly
fairer than the human condition (M = 3.47). For
perceptions of trustworthiness, however, there is no
significant difference between the conditions (p =
0.113). Hence, neither H1 nor H2 are supported by our
analyses. In fact, H1 is reversely supported, eventually
suggesting that for our study setup, informational
fairness perceptions tend to be higher towards the
ADS compared to the human decision-maker. Based
on qualitative responses from study participants, we
conjecture that this might be due to the perceived
absence of emotions and subjectivity in automation.
Other potential reasons for this based on qualitative
feedback are given in Section 5.2. Note that this
finding seems contradictory to some prior works’ results
(e.g., Castelo et al. [35]), which raises doubts about
the generalizability of such findings beyond specific
domains.
Interestingly, when considering people’s AI literacy,
these results change. For this analysis, we split our
data into two (approximately equal-sized) sub-samples
along the median value of AI literacy. We refer to
one sample as high AI literacy participants and the
other as low AI literacy participants. We then conduct
separate Mann-Whitney U tests for the two sub-samples.
Participants with high AI literacy perceive the ADS
as significantly more informationally fair (p = 0.021)
and more trustworthy (p = 0.042) than the human
decision-maker. For participants with low AI literacy,
we do not find a significant difference for perceptions
of informational fairness (p = 0.312) or trustworthiness
(p = 0.995) between the human and the ADS condition.
Hence, we conclude that AI literacy has a moderating
effect, which supports H3 and H4. As stated in
Section 3, we expected the moderating effect of AI
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Table 1. Correlations and measurement information for latent factors.
Factor M SD CA CR AVE INFF TRST AILIT
INFF 3.57 0.62 0.83 0.83 0.50 1.00
TRST 3.45 0.72 0.94 0.94 0.72 0.69 1.00
AILIT 2.87 0.61 0.71 0.72 0.39 0.30 0.27 1.00
Notes: M = Mean; SD = Standard deviation
literacy. However, the finding that people with high AI
literacy tend to perceive ADS as both fairer and more
trustworthy than human decision-makers is not obvious
to us. On the one hand, we might think that people with
high AI literacy understand such systems better and are
thus less skeptical; on the other hand, it might well be
the case that the same type of people are more aware of
the shortcomings of ADS (e.g., [3, 12, 13]).
5.2. Qualitative insights based on open-ended
questions
We also collected unstructured textual data
based on open-ended questions embedded in our
questionnaires. An in-depth analysis reveals that many
study participants are convinced that automation is
precisely the reason why decisions are fair (“Automated
system is fair by design”). They perceive the ADS
as fair because, in their opinion, its decisions are
objective: “it [the ADS] states the criteria and follows
[them], there is no room for subjectivity and the data
is used to make an objective decision.” This is likely
one of the reasons why our hypotheses H1 and H2
are not supported. While some participants allude to
underlying issues of automated decisions (“AI can be
programmed to be unfair” and “I do not believe an
Automated Decision System can replace a human. We
can’t expect it to not make mistakes”), most view the
ADS as fair because the system is “purely looking at
numbers [therefore] its [sic] completely fair.” Finally,
one person points out that the situation “is fair because
the consumer knows that he has been judged using an
algorithm.”
On the other hand, an interesting comment states
that “[t]he decision may have been made by a machine,
but someone decided to program it that way,” which
raises questions around accountability of ADS. Some
issues are equally criticized in the human and the ADS
condition: “I don’t think it is fair to take education,
gender or marital status into account,” or “[s]ome
factors are indifferent to the decision of the loan
and are personal information.” Even though overall
the human condition is perceived as significantly less
informationally fair than the ADS condition and people
believe the ADS “can help eliminate [...] bias,” there
are still participants who “hope bots wont [sic] have to
decide crucial life decisions for [them].”
6. Conclusion and outlook
We conducted an online study with 200 participants
to evaluate differences in people’s perceptions of
informational fairness and trustworthiness towards
human vs. automated decision-making in the
high-stakes context of lending. We provided
thorough explanations to study participants, identical
in both conditions (human and automated), to
facilitate meaningful and unbiased responses. Our
findings suggest that within the scope of our study
setup—contrary to some prior work as well as our
own hypothesis—automated decisions are perceived as
more informationally fair than human-made decisions.
In contrast, no significant differences were measured
for trustworthiness in our case. Based on qualitative
responses, it appears that people particularly appreciate
the absence of subjectivity in ADS as well as their
data-driven approach. Interestingly, our analyses also
imply that people’s AI literacy affects their perceptions,
given the provided explanations. Specifically, we found
that people with high AI literacy tend to perceive ADS
as both fairer and more trustworthy than a human
decision-maker, whereas no significant differences for
either construct were detected for people with low AI
literacy.
Based on our findings, we may conjecture
that providing thorough explanations can enhance
perceptions of fairness and trustworthiness towards
ADS over human decision-makers—particularly for
people with higher AI literacy. This hypothesis will
have to be tested in follow-up work. However, we must
be cognizant of the dangers of wrongful persuasion
and automation biases, i.e., the tendency of people to
over-rely on ADS—which might become a problem
if too many (compelling) explanations about the inner
workings of ADS are provided. Future work should
also account for this by examining how perceptions
change when the quality of the ADS changes for the
worse (e.g., by making unfair decisions) [55]. Other
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natural extensions include the consideration of domains
other than lending, as well as the adoption of different
explanation styles. We hope that our work will stimulate
multifaceted future research on this topic of utmost
societal relevance.
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